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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Israel Fulton appeals from his judgment of conviction for sexual battery of a minor child.
On appeal, Fulton raises several claims of trial error, only two of which are preserved: (1) that
the prosecutor committed misconduct by, allegedly, appealing to the passions of the jury and (2)
that the district court erred when it denied Fulton’s motion for a mistrial. The rest of his several
claims are unpreserved.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
D.B. thought that she had a close relationship with her uncle, Fulton. They texted
together and had private conversations on Twitter. (Tr., p.85, Ls.1-17.) He requested pictures of
her. (Tr., p.87, Ls.1-8.) They kept inside secrets. (Compare Tr., p.62, Ls.16-20 with p.87, L.19
– p.88, L.6.) He talked to her about his problems with his family and got her to open up with
him about her concerns during her parents’ divorce. (Tr., p.88, Ls.9-17.) D.B. saw Fulton as her
“cool” uncle—the one she “always wanted to hang out with when [she] was on family trips,”
who she felt “comfortable telling things to,” and who “could offer some insight … to …
whatever [she] was going through at the time.” (Tr., p.89, Ls.6-23.) And then he molested her.
On the last night of a family reunion at Jefferson Lake, Fulton approached D.B. while she
was alone, walking around the lake at night. (Tr., p.89, L.24 – p.90, L.15; p.92, L.16 – p.93,
L.1.) First he took her hand. (Tr., p.93, Ls.2-8.) He asked her to sit with him on a bench. (Tr.,
p.93, Ls.9-11.) He kissed her, more than once. (Tr., p.93, Ls.11-12.) Then he had her sit on his
lap, and he began rubbing her through her leggings. (Tr., p.93, Ls.12-14.) He was momentarily
interrupted by a patrol car, and D.B. was able to walk away, but not too far. (Tr., p.93, Ls.1525.) Fulton caught up with her, sat her down again, kissed her again, unclipped her bra, and
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fondled her bare breasts under her shirt. (Tr., p.93, L.24 – p.94, L.2; p.94, Ls.16-20.) D.B. tried
to walk away, but Fulton shoved her against a trailer, put his hand down her pants, and started
rubbing her vagina while asking her, “Are you going to come? Are you going to come?” (Tr.,
p.94, Ls.5-12; p.95, Ls.10-19 (spelling original).)
D.B. finally was able to push her uncle away and, ashamed, returned to camp. (Tr., p.94,
Ls.12-15; p.96, L.22 – p.97, L.10.) The assault was eventually reported and the state charged
Fulton under Idaho Code § 18-1508A with sexual battery of a minor child, alleging that he
committed lewd and lascivious acts upon the body of D.B., a sixteen-year-old, by engaging in
manual-genital contact. (R., pp.44-45.) Fulton pleaded not guilty (R., pp.48-49) and the case
went to trial (R., pp.93-101; see also Tr.).
At trial, Fulton corroborated D.B.’s testimony that they held hands (Tr., p.136, Ls.15-21);
that they kissed (Tr., p.136, L.22 – p.137, L.3) and kissed (p.139, Ls.8-12) and kissed (p.141,
Ls.6-8); that she sat on his lap (Tr., p.139, L.17); that he undid her bra and fondled her bare
breasts (Tr., p.139, Ls.17-21); and that he pushed her up against a trailer to make-out with her
(Tr., p.140, L.23 – p.141, L.8). The only thing Fulton denied was touching D.B.’s genitalia.
(Tr., p.140, Ls.5-14; p.141, Ls.9-13; p.142, L.25 – p.143, L.3.)
After an unreported informal conference on the jury instructions, the district court
provided a special verdict form with lesser included offenses, to which the parties agreed. (See
Tr., p.153, Ls.20-25; Supp. Tr., p.57, L.24 – p.58, L.2; see also R., pp.80-81.) The lesser
included offenses were not necessary: The jury found Fulton guilty of sexual abuse of D.B.
amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct. (R., p.80.) The district court entered judgment
against Fulton and sentenced him to a unified term of 15 years with seven years fixed, but
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.107-08.) Fulton filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.124-26.)
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ISSUES
Fulton’s statement of the issues on appeal is found at page 6 of his Appellant’s brief and
is lengthy. The state consolidates and rephrases the issues as:
1.
Notwithstanding the prosecutor’s objected-to statement during closing argument, did
Fulton receive a fair trial?
2.
Has Fulton failed to show reversible error in the district court’s denial of his motion for a
mistrial?
3.

Has Fulton failed to show that the cumulative error doctrine applies to this case?

4.
Has Fulton failed to show fundamental error entitling him to review of his unpreserved
claims of prosecutorial misconduct?
5.

Has Fulton failed to show fundamental error in the jury instructions?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Notwithstanding The Prosecutor’s Objected-To Statement During Closing Argument, Fulton
Received A Fair Trial
A.

Introduction
In the middle of a somewhat disjointed closing argument, the prosecutor briefly reflected

on Fulton’s testimony offered during trial, saying:
Now, I would like to discuss how witnesses often act. And in sexual
abuse cases, sometimes there is no victim that can testify, say a four- or five-yearold child or a three-year-old infant. So when a defendant takes the stand and says,
“I didn’t do it”—we would never convict anyone if they all said, “I didn’t do it.”
And in this case the defendant takes the stand and says, “I did this and this and
this.” But what’s he trying to do to you? He’s trying to gain your confidence.
He’s grooming you.
(Supp. Tr., p.85, Ls.11-21.) Defense counsel objected. (Supp. Tr., p.85, Ls.22-24.) The district
court overruled the objection, but reminded everyone, “It’s just argument.” (Supp. Tr., p.85,
L.25 – p.86, L.1.)
Now on appeal, Fulton argues that the challenged statement constituted misconduct that
deprived him of a fair trial. (Appellant’s brief, pp.44-45.) This argument fails. A review of the
prosecutor’s statement, in context of the trial as a whole and in light of the applicable legal
standards, shows that the statement, even if not proper, was also not prejudicial.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a claim of prosecutorial misconduct that was accompanied by a

contemporaneous objection at trial, the appellate court “engages in a two-step analysis—first
asking whether misconduct occurred and, if so, whether the misconduct was harmless.” State v.
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Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 927, 354 P.3d 462, 489 (2015) (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227,
245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010)).

C.

The Prosecutor’s Statement Did Not Deprive Fulton Of His Right To A Fair Trial
With respect to closing argument, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned:
Isolated passages of a prosecutor’s argument, billed in advance to the jury
as a matter of opinion not of evidence, do not reach the same proportions [as
consistent and repeated misrepresentation that may have a significant impact on a
jury’s deliberations]. Such arguments, like all closing arguments of counsel, are
seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation frequently
results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than crystal clear. While these
general observations in no way justify prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest
that a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark
to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy
exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging
interpretations.

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974). The Idaho Supreme Court has also
recognized the importance of reviewing closing arguments in light of their improvisational
nature, noting that “in reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate court]
must keep in mind the realities of trial.” State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285
(2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-428, 725 P.2d 128, 132-133 (1986)).
“Generally, both parties are given wide latitude in making their arguments to the jury and
discussing the evidence and inferences to be made therefrom.” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,
720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009) (citations omitted). A prosecutor’s comments “must be evaluated
in light of defense conduct and in the context of the entire trial.” Id. (citations and quotations
omitted); see also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179 (1986) (“[t]he prosecutors’
comments must be evaluated in light of the defense argument that preceded it”). “[A] criminal
conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor’s comments standing alone,
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for the statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined
whether the prosecutor’s conduct affected the fairness of the trial.” United States v. Young, 470
U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Application of these foregoing legal standards to the prosecutor’s comment,
viewing that comment in the context of the trial, shows that the comment would not have
affected the overall fairness of the trial.
In the context of sexual abuse, “grooming” can be a loaded term. 1 However, during
Fulton’s trial, “grooming” was given a much more benign meaning. During that trial, the
prosecutor asked two separate police officers to define grooming.

The first defined it as

techniques employed “to manipulate another person to get them to do what they want” or “to
gain a younger person’s trust.” (Tr., p.37, L.14 – p.38, L.5.) The second defined it, similarly, as
techniques to make people feel more comfortable around and trusting of an individual. (Tr.,
p.72, Ls.1-23.) Notably, and contrary to Fulton’s assertions on appeal, neither officer tied
“grooming” to sexual conduct, much less illicit sexual conduct.
The state agrees that it would be objectionable to argue to the jury that the purpose of
Fulton’s admissions was merely to manipulate the jurors. However, it would be proper argument
to ask the jurors to consider the possibility that Fulton was admitting some criminal conduct to
make his (false) partial denial seem more plausible. The latter appears to be a fair reading of the
prosecutor’s argument and, in this context, the argument was not unduly inflammatory nor as
unfairly prejudicial as Fulton claims on appeal.

1

For example, the Idaho Court of Appeals has previously defined “grooming,” in the context of
a child sexual abuse case, as “conduct intended to foster trust and remove defenses over time
through a pattern of seduction and preparation, resulting in the child being willing and compliant
to the defendant’s sexual abuse. State v. Coleman, 152 Idaho 872, 877, 276 P.3d 744, 749 (Ct.
App. 2012).
6

Moreover, again in context of the whole trial, and contrary to Fulton’s assertions, the
district court’s reminder that the prosecutor’s statements are “just argument” is curative of any
potential prejudice. Prior to reading the jury instructions, the district court informed the jury
“that the closing arguments are not evidence. They’re merely argument. The evidence is what
you’ve heard the witnesses testify to and any exhibits that will come with you in the jury room.”
(Tr., p.156, Ls.9-14.) The district court then instructed the jury again:
As a member of the jury, it’s your duty to decide what the facts are and to
apply those facts to the law that I have given you. You are to decide the facts
from all the evidence presented in the case.
The evidence you are to consider consists of sworn testimony of
witnesses, exhibits which have been admitted into evidence, and any facts to
which the parties have stipulated.
Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including
arguments and statements by lawyers—lawyers are not witnesses. What they say
in their opening statements, closing arguments, and at other times is included to
help you interpret the evidence but is not evidence. If the facts as you remember
them differ from the way the lawyers have stated them, follow your memory….
(Supp. Tr., p.61, L.12 – p.62, L.3 (Instruction No. 2).)
“[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.”
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). The function of appellate review is “not to
discipline the prosecutor for misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere
with the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho 904, 908, 231 P.3d 549,
553 (Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted). In light of its proper instructions, the district court’s
reminder that the prosecutor’s statement was merely argument—and therefore not evidence upon
which the jury was to decide the facts—cured whatever prejudice Fulton may have suffered,
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ensuring that he was able to receive a fair trial. Therefore, even if the prosecutor’s objected-to
comment was improper, there is no prejudice, and any such error does not require reversal.

II.
Fulton Has Failed To Establish Error In The District Court’s Denial Of His Motion For A
Mistrial
A.

Introduction
Idaho Code § 18-1508A provides, in pertinent part:
It is a felony for any person at least five (5) years of age older than a minor child
who is sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years of age, who, with the intent of
arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust, passion, or sexual desires of such
person, minor child, or third party, to:
(a)
Commit any lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or with the body or any
part or any member thereof of such minor child....
(c)
Cause or have sexual contact with such minor child, not amounting to
lewd conduct….

I.C. § 18-1508A(1)(a) and (c).
Jury Instruction Nos. 4 and 5 appear to have originally quoted this express language for,
respectively, sexual battery amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct and sexual battery not
amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct. (See Supp. Tr., p.62, L.18 – p.65, L.25.) As the
district court read the first instruction to the jury, defense counsel requested a sidebar. (Tr.,
p.156, Ls.17-25.) After that sidebar, the district court ordered the jury to “[c]ross out ‘felony’
and write over the top ‘crime,’” and then reread the modified instruction. (Tr., p.157, Ls.4-15.)
The district court came to the next instruction, and defense counsel again requested a sidebar
(Tr., p.157, Ls.16-22), following which the district court again ordered the jury to “cross out
‘felony’ and write ‘crime’” before reading the instruction (Tr., p.158, Ls.1-11).
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Notwithstanding these modifications to the instructions, after the jury left the courtroom
to deliberate, defense counsel made a motion for a mistrial, claiming that Fulton might be
prejudiced by the initial use of “felony” as opposed to “crime” in Instruction Nos. 4 and 5. (Tr.,
p.161, L.20 – p.164, L.11.) The district court denied the motion. (Tr., p.165, L.20 – p.166,
L.14.) On appeal, Fulton asserts this was error. (Appellant’s brief, pp.57-62.) Application of
the correct legal standards to the facts of this case, however, shows no reversible error.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review on a motion for mistrial is well-established:
The question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his
discretion in light of the circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was
made. Rather, the question must be whether the event which precipitated the
motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the
full record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case,
the “abuse of discretion” standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately
stated, is one of reversible error. [The Court’s] focus is upon the continuing
impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial
judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed
retrospectively, constituted reversible error.

State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 536-37, 285 P.3d 348, 351-52 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations
omitted).

C.

The District Court Did Not Err By Denying Fulton’s Motion For A Mistrial
Motions for mistrial are governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1. State v. Barcella, 135

Idaho 191, 197, 16 P.3d 288, 294 (Ct. App. 2000). Under part (a) of that rule, “[a] mistrial may
be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or legal
defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the
defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” I.C.R. 29.1(a). Fulton bears the burden of
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showing that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his motion for a mistrial.
State v. Ellis, 99 Idaho 606, 608, 586 P.2d 1050, 1052 (1978); State v. Rodriquez, 106 Idaho 30,
33, 674 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Ct. App. 1983). Fulton has failed to establish that correctly classifying
sexual battery as a felony was error in the first place, or that, in light of the court’s curative
measures, he was deprived of a fair trial.
Fulton was charged with sexual battery of a minor amounting to lewd and lascivious
conduct under Idaho Code § 18-1508A(1)(a). In the special verdict form, the parties also
included the lesser included offense of sexual battery of a minor not amounting to lewd and
lascivious conduct under subsection (1)(c) of the same statute. Instructions, whose language was
pulled directly from Idaho Code § 18-1508A, were given on both theories of sexual battery. (See
Supp. Tr., p.62, L.18 – p.65, L.25 (Instruction Nos. 4 and 5).) That statute begins, “It is a felony
….” I.C. § 18-1508A (emphasis added). “Ordinarily the language employed by the legislature
in defining a crime is deemed to be best suited for that purpose, and error cannot be predicated
on its use in jury instructions.” State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996)
(citing State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 362, 690 P.2d 293, 297 (1984); State v. Herr, 97 Idaho
783, 787-88, 554 P.2d 961, 965-66 (1976)); -see --also ---------State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 373, 64 P.3d
296, 299 (2002) (“Generally giving an instruction in statutory language is not error.”). It was not
error to instruct the jurors using the literal words of the statute.
Even if it could be error to classify violations of the statute prohibiting sexual battery of
minors as felonies (despite the language of the statute), Fulton suffered no prejudice from
including (and then modifying at the request of the defense) the statute’s literal language. First,
the district court had the instructions amended to “crime” instead of “felony,” and this Court
presumes that the jury heeded the court’s instructions. State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718, 264
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P.3d 54, 59 (2011) (citing Phillips v. Erhart, 151 Idaho 100, 109, 254 P.3d 1, 10 (2011)). Fulton
has not rebutted that presumption. Second, no reasonable juror aware of the nuanced distinctions
between “crimes,” “felonies,” and “misdemeanors” could believe that sexually battering a minor
would constitute anything less than a felony in the State of Idaho. Third, if anything, being told
to replace “felony” with “crime” could lead a juror to conclude that the particular crime must not
be a felony, which would mediate against Fulton’s claimed prejudice. And finally, as the district
court noted, because jurors are more likely to hesitate before convicting someone of a felony
than of other crimes, it is the state—and not the defense—that is prejudiced when the jury knows
that a crime constitutes a felony. (Tr., p.166, Ls.2-12.)
It was not error to give instructions to the jury which defined sexual battery of a minor—
consistent with the statute from which the instructions were drawn—as a felony. Modifying that
instruction (in response to defense counsel’s objection) to substitute “crime” for “felony” was
also not error. Even assuming some error, there is no prejudice to Fulton. There is, therefore, no
reversible error, and the district court correctly denied the motion for mistrial.

III.
Fulton Has Failed To Establish That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies To This Case
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of themselves,
may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872
P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate to application of the doctrine is a finding of more
than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 407, 958 P.2d 22, 33 (Ct. App. 1998). Fulton
has failed to show that any objected-to errors occurred at his trial, and therefore the doctrine is
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inapplicable to this case. See, e.g., LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 121, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct.
App. 1997). 2
Even if this Court concludes that objected-to errors occurred during Fulton’s trial, Fulton
has still failed to show that any of those alleged errors deprived him of his due process right to a
fair trial, and only that would require reversal. State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d
288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of errors still deemed harmless absent prejudice); State
v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997). As noted above, “the
Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.” Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). Even assuming some error on the issues where Fulton raised
objections below, such errors did not deprive Fulton of a fair trial, and he has therefore failed to
show reversible error on any of these issues.

IV.
Fulton Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error Entitling Him To Review Of His Unpreserved
Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Fulton claims that several of the prosecutor’s unobjected-to

statements during closing argument constitute misconduct.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.28-45.)

Application of the correct legal standards to the record, however, shows that Fulton has failed to
show error, much less fundamental error entitling him to review of these unpreserved issues.

2

Analytically, it is impossible to cumulate unpreserved errors. Unpreserved errors will only be
reached if they constitute fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961,
979 (2010). To show fundamental error, the appellant is required to show that he was prejudiced
by a clear violation of a constitutional right which occurred at trial. Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
If the appellant shows fundamental error, then the appellant is entitled to reversal. Id. If the
alleged violation was not prejudicial, then there is no fundamental error to accumulate.
12

B.

Standard Of Review
“[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct depends on

whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,
715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2008). If a defendant fails to timely object at trial to allegedly improper
closing arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial
misconduct only upon a showing by the defendant that the alleged misconduct rises to the level
of fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010).

C.

The Challenged Portions Of The Prosecutor’s Closing Argument Do Not Constitute
Misconduct, Much Less Fundamental Error
Because Fulton failed to preserve his various claims of prosecutorial misconduct

analyzed herein by timely objection below, he is required to show fundamental error on appeal.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. To establish fundamental error,
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged
error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights;
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was
a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.
Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Because review of the record shows that the prosecutor’s arguments
were not improper, Fulton has failed to show error, much less fundamental error entitling him to
review of these unpreserved claims of error.
“Generally, both parties are given wide latitude in making their arguments to the jury and
discussing the evidence and inferences to be made therefrom.” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,
720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009) (citations omitted). Prosecutorial misconduct only occurs where
the prosecutor “so infect[s] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial
of due process.” State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318, 127 P.3d 212, 221 (Ct. App. 2005).
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As set forth above, with respect to alleged prosecutorial misconduct specifically in the
context of closing argument, the United States Supreme Court has stated:
Isolated passages of a prosecutor’s argument, billed in advance to the jury
as a matter of opinion not of evidence, do not reach the same proportions [as
consistent and repeated misrepresentation that may have a significant impact on a
jury’s deliberations]. Such arguments, like all closing arguments of counsel, are
seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation frequently
results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than crystal clear. While these
general observations in no way justify prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest
that a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark
to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy
exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging
interpretations.
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974).
The Idaho Supreme Court has reiterated the importance of reviewing closing arguments
in light of their improvisational nature, noting that “in reviewing allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct [the appellate court] must keep in mind the realities of trial.” State v. Field, 144
Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-428, 725
P.2d 128, 132-133 (1986)). Moreover, as noted above, a prosecutor’s comments “must be
evaluated in light of defense conduct and in the context of the entire trial.” Severson, 147 Idaho
at 720, 215 P.3d at 440 (citations and quotations omitted); see
also Darden
v.- -Wainwright,
- ------- - - - - - - 477
U.S. 168, 179 (1986) (“[t]he prosecutors’ comments must be evaluated in light of the defense
argument that preceded it”); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“only by [viewing
the prosecutor’s comments in context] can it be determined whether the prosecutor’s conduct
affected the fairness of the trial”). Finally, the Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized “[t]he
right to due process does not guarantee a defendant an error-free trial but a fair one,” and the
function of appellate review is “not to discipline the prosecutor for misconduct, but to ensure that
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any such misconduct did not interfere with the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” State v.
Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991).
Application of these foregoing standards shows that the prosecutor’s statements, taken in
context and recognizing the improvisational and imprecise nature of closing argument, do not
constitute misconduct, much less fundamental error.

1.

The Prosecutor Did Not Misrepresent The Law

Fulton, block-quoting portions of the prosecutor’s closing argument (Supp. Tr. p.76, L.25
– p.80, L.18), argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by diminishing the state’s burden
and/or misrepresenting the law. (Appellant’s brief, pp.31-35.) A fair reading of the prosecutor’s
argument belies Fulton’s assertions. The prosecutor simply argued that the state had proven its
charge—that Fulton committed manual-genital contact against D.B.—and that the jury should
therefore convict him. However, even if the jury did not believe the state’s case, it should still
convict Fulton because his defense to the charged crime—that he unclasped D.B.’s bra and
fondled her bare breasts while making-out with her as she sat on his lap, but did not engage in
manual-genital contact—under the specific facts of this case, was an admission to the crime as
defined by the statute. (See Supp. Tr., p.76, L.25 – p.79, L.22.)
The prosecutor was correct. Idaho Code § 18-1508A criminalizes sexual battery of a
minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age, and provides:
It is a felony for any person at least five (5) years of age older than a
minor child who is sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years of age, who, with the
intent of arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust, passion, or sexual desires of
such person, minor child, or third party, to:
(a) Commit any lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or with the body or
any part or any member thereof of such minor child including, but not limited to,
genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact,

15

manual-anal contact or manual-genital contact, whether between persons of the
same or opposite sex, or who shall involve such minor child in any act of explicit
sexual conduct as defined in section 18-1507, Idaho Code….
I.C. § 18-1508A(1)(a) (emphasis added). Idaho Code § 18-1507 defines explicit sexual conduct
as “sexual intercourse, erotic fondling, erotic nudity, masturbation, sadomasochism, sexual
excitement, or bestiality.” I.C. § 18-1507(e) (emphasis added). “Erotic fondling,” in turn, is
defined as:
touching a person’s clothed or unclothed genitals or pubic area, developing or
undeveloped genitals or pubic area (if the person is a child), buttocks, breasts (if
the person is a female), or developing or undeveloped breast area (if the person is
a female child), for the purpose of real or simulated overt sexual gratification or
stimulation of one (1) or more of the persons involved. “Erotic fondling” shall not
be construed to include physical contact, even if affectionate, which is not for the
purpose of real or simulated overt sexual gratification or stimulation of one (1) or
more of the persons involved.
I.C. § 18-1507(c) (emphasis added).
As a matter of law, Fulton’s defense, that he “merely” made-out with D.B. while
unsnapping her bra and fondling her bare breasts, is not actually a defense to sexual battery of a
minor amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct as defined by the statute. See
- I.C. § 181508A(1)(a). The state did not commit prosecutorial misconduct, much less fundamental error,
when it correctly argued that Fulton’s defense was, in fact, an admission to the charged offense.
Fulton also asserts that the state misrepresented the law when it (correctly) argued that
Fulton’s admitted conduct “can’t possibly be just simple battery” because it was sexual in nature.
(Appellant’s brief, p.33.) Fulton’s argument fails. First, he takes the prosecutor’s comments
out-of-context. In context, defense counsel argued that the jury could convict Fulton of the least
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of the lesser-included offenses, battery. (See Supp. Tr., p.92, L.23 – p.93, L.24.) 3 When the full
quote is read, it is clear that the prosecutor was responding to this argument. (See Supp. Tr.,
p.97, Ls.5-13.) And, again, the prosecutor was correct: the sexual conduct Fulton admitted to, at
the very least, constitutes a sexual battery, not just a simple battery.
The prosecutor’s argument did not misrepresent the law nor did it diminish the state’s
burden. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct, much less fundamental error entitling
Fulton to review of this unpreserved claim of error.

2.

The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Misconduct By Asking The Jury To Convict
Fulton To Bring Justice To The Victim In This Case

Fulton claims that the prosecutor appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury when
he stated:
This isn’t a pleasant experience for anyone. And most of all I’m proud of
the little victim to come forward, to prevent this type of activity. And do we want
to send a message? Certainly we do. But most of all we want justice, and that’s
up to you.
It’s been a pleasure, as much as it can be, being before you. This is what I
do. But these are the kind of cases that make you solemn, make you don’t sleep
at night, that make you worry about your grandchildren, your children, and others.
This is a good community. We must keep it that way.
(Supp. Tr., p.97, L. – p.98, L.5.) Fulton claims that the prosecutor’s statement was an effort to
urge the jurors to convict the defendant in order to protect community standards.

(See

Appellant’s brief, pp.36-37.) Fulton’s argument fails under the fundamental error standard.
3

Ironically, in this argument, it was defense counsel who actually misrepresented the law when
he claimed that “affectionate” fondling of breasts does not constitute sexual battery. (Supp. Tr.,
p.93, Ls.1-4.) While such fondling would not be “erotic fondling,” as defined by Idaho Code
§ 18-1507, and so would not constitute sexual battery amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct
under Idaho Code § 18-1508A(1)(a), it likely would still constitute sexual battery not amounting
to lewd and lascivious conduct under Idaho Code § 18-1508A(1)(c).
17

Curiously, Fulton fails to cite any Idaho authority to support his argument that a
prosecutor cannot urge conviction to protect community standards, which appears required to
sustain a claim of fundamental error. See State v. Hadden, 152 Idaho 371, 375, 271 P.3d 1227,
1231 (Ct. App. 2012). Instead, Fulton relies on precedents from the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. But decisions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, even on questions of federal law,
do not bind Idaho courts. State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413, ___, 398 P.3d 146, 148 (2017)
(citing Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Services, Inc., 142 Idaho 235, 240, 127
P.3d 138, 143 (2005)). Fulton might instead rely on cases such as State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho
904, 909, 231 P.3d 549, 554 (Ct. App. 2010), which have held that arguing for conviction merely
to protect the public, untethered to the evidence admitted at trial, is misconduct. Of course, the
Court of Appeals also held in Troutman that arguments which could “evoke sympathy” and
“engender goodwill” for the victim, when based on the evidence, are not improper. Id. at 91011, 231 P.3d at 555-56.
In either regard, the error Fulton alleges is simply not clear on the record. As noted
above, closing arguments are improvisational—and that is especially true of rebuttal argument.
A fair reading of the prosecutor’s argument shows that the central thrust was for the jury to
convict, not to “send a message,” but so the victim would have justice. The prosecutor said,
“And do we want to send a message? Certainly we do. But most of all we want justice, and
that’s up to you.” (Supp. Tr., p.97, Ls.22-24.) That was not error. “Justice is, after all, the goal
of any criminal trial.” State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 864, 216 P.3d 146, 153 (Ct. App. 2009).
Asking for a conviction so the victim can have justice, “in the context of an argument addressing
how trial evidence demonstrates the defendant’s guilt,” is a proper argument. Id. Where this fair
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alternative reading of the prosecutor’s statement exists, Fulton cannot show that it is clear that
the prosecutor made an improper argument, much less committed fundamental error.

3.

The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Misconduct When, After Expressing Confidence
In His Case, He Told The Jury That Its Decision Should Rest On The Evidence
And Not The Prosecutor’s Personal Beliefs

Cherry-picking several quotes and taking them out of context, Fulton argues that the
prosecutor committed misconduct by expressing his personal beliefs. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3740.) This claim also fails under the fundamental error standard.
First, as noted above, fundamental error requires Fulton to show the violation of an
unwaived constitutional right. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. But, according to
Fulton, there is no binding Idaho authority stating that a prosecutor’s expression of personal
belief implicates, much less violates, a constitutional right. (See Appellant’s brief, p.40, n. 8.)
Fulton therefore cannot show fundamental error.
Second, even assuming it could be, under certain circumstances, a constitutional violation
for a prosecutor to express personal beliefs regarding the state’s case and witness credibility,
Fulton cannot show that the prosecutor clearly did that in this case. While the prosecutor
expressed conviction in the state’s case, it also recognized that the question was for the jury, and
that the jury could interpret the evidence differently. (See Supp. Tr., p.79, L.23 – p.82, L.3.) In
fact, the prosecutor specifically told the jury that “you have to go with what the evidence was,
not with my beliefs, but with your beliefs.” (Supp. Tr., p.81, Ls.4-6.) And the prosecutor’s
arguments on credibility were based on the witnesses’ demeanor, which the jury was able to
observe during trial, not mere personal belief. (Supp. Tr., p.78, L.12 – p.78, L.24; p.86, Ls.2-5.)
Moreover, in reference to the victim’s credibility, even defense counsel acknowledged
that D.B. was “about the best witnesses [he had] ever seen. And I’ve seen experts testify.”
19

(Supp. Tr., p.90, Ls.2-3.) 4 The prosecutor cannot commit misconduct by responding during
rebuttal to what defense counsel had just said, and then arguing from that uncontested
observation the proper inference that D.B. had testified so well because it is easier to tell a
consistent story when that story is true.
Third, even if Fulton could show that the prosecutor clearly vouched for the witness’s
credibility based solely on his personal beliefs, and that such violated a constitutional right,
Fulton cannot show prejudice. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Young, the
primary danger in a prosecutor’s vouching for credibility or expressing personal opinion
(unsupported by evidence) of the defendant’s guilt is that it may “convey the impression that
evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the
defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant’s right to be tried solely on the basis of the
evidence presented to the jury….” Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19. The prosecutor did not convey
any impression that he was aware of evidence that had been withheld from the jury; rather, he
relied on the evidence which had been presented to the jury and argued inferences therefrom.
Fulton, therefore, was not prejudiced by the prosecutor’s statements of personal belief.

4.

The Prosecutor Did Not Disparage Defense Counsel

Finally, again ignoring the context in which the prosecutor’s statements were offered,
Fulton claims that the prosecutor disparaged defense counsel by noting that the defense had
attempted to taint and impugn the victim. (Appellant’s brief, pp.40-41.) First, to note that the
defense strategy during trial was to impugn the victim does not disparage defense counsel and
was not misconduct. See State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 188-89, 254 P.3d 77, 89-90 (Ct. App.

4

The state agrees with defense counsel that D.B. was an exceptional witness. (See, e.g., Tr.,
p.119, L.16 – p.120, L.9.)
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2011) (comments on defense theories, not directed at defense counsel personally, do not
constitute misconduct). And il faut appeler un chat un chat—The defense did in fact seek to
taint the victim. (See, e.g., Supp. Tr., p.89, L.24 – p.91, L.5; p.94, Ls.13-18.) During crossexamination of D.B., defense counsel began by implying that D.B.’s testimony had been
coached.

(Tr., p.101, Ls.6-14.) The defense later tried to explore her sexual history and

experiences. (Tr., p.107, L.3 – p.108, L.4.) And, while questioning another witness, defense
counsel tried to paint D.B. as the sexual aggressor. (See Tr., p.61, Ls.15-25; p.62, Ls.1-20;
p.125, Ls.14-18; p.126, L.20 – p.127, L.20.) To express that the defense strategy was, in fact,
the defense strategy does not constitute misconduct, much less fundamental error.

D.

Even If The Prosecutor’s Proper Arguments Could Constitute Misconduct, Fulton Has
Still Failed To Show Fundamental Error
As noted above, the second prong of Perry requires the defendant to show that his alleged

constitutional violation “plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a
tactical decision)….” Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Fulton cannot meet this standard
because he cannot show that defense counsel’s decisions to refrain from objecting during the
prosecutor’s closing argument were not tactical. Clearly defense counsel knew he could object
during closing argument; he in fact did object. (Supp. Tr., p.85, Ls.22-24.) Defense counsel
may have reasonably chosen to refrain from objecting to the above-referenced statements so as to
not bring possible damaging interpretations of the prosecutor’s closing argument to the attention
of the jury, particularly where those interpretations are not readily apparent on the record.
Ultimately, Fulton has failed to demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct, let alone
misconduct that satisfies the Perry fundamental error standard, with respect to any of the
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challenged portions of the prosecutor’s closing argument. Fulton has failed to show that he is
entitled to review of any of these unpreserved claims of error. This Court should therefore
affirm Fulton’s conviction.

V.
Fulton Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Jury Instructions
A.

Introduction
Throughout his Appellant’s brief, Fulton raises several challenges to the jury instructions

given in this case. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.7-28, 47-57.) None of these arguments was
preserved by timely objection below, and Fulton has failed to show fundamental error entitling
him to review of these unpreserved claims of error.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the appellate

court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 853, 864-65
(2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000)). “An erroneous
instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions as a whole misled the jury
or prejudiced a party.” State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01
(2010) (citing Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459, 462, 111 P.3d 144, 147 (2005)).

C.

Fulton Is Not Entitled To Review Of His Unpreserved Claims Of Instructional Error
“It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be

made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal.” State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389,
398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000); see also Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at 865 (“An
error generally is not reviewable if raised for the first time on appeal.”) (citing State v. Sheahan,
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139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003)). This same principle applies to alleged errors in
jury instructions. See I.C.R. 30(b) (“No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give
an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict,
stating distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.”);
Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at 865. Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this
state will only review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. -Id.; --see --also ----State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
As set forth above, to establish fundamental error,
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged
error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights;
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was
a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.
Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
Each of Fulton’s claims of error in the jury instructions must fail, generally, under the
fundamental error standard.

As noted above, under the fundamental error standard, the

defendant must show that the alleged error violates an unwaived constitutional right. Id. As the
Idaho Supreme Court once recognized in State v. Carter, 103 Idaho 917, 919, 655 P.2d 434, 436
(1981), where a party does not object to an instruction in a criminal case, the right to raise the
instruction on appeal is waived. This holding and its grounds were discussed by the Idaho
Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 225, 228, 786 P.2d 1127, 1131 (1990). In Smith, the
Court explained that the criminal trial underlying Carter took place in 1978, and the rule that was
then in effect stated, “No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission
therefrom unless he objects thereto prior to the time that the jury is charged.” Id. In 1980,
however, Idaho Criminal Rule 30 was amended and this sentence was removed. Id. Because
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that language had been removed from the rule, the Idaho Supreme Court retreated from its
holding in Carter and allowed defendants to challenge jury instructions on appeal, even where
they had not objected below. Id. at 229, 786 P.2d at 1131.
Idaho Criminal Rule 30 has since been amended again. In 2015, when Fulton stood trial,
the rule once more contained the language:
No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless
the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, unless the
party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating
distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the
objection.
I.C.R. 30(b) (2004). 5 Under the Idaho Supreme Court’s holdings and logic in Carter and Smith,
supra, because the rule again does not allow assigning as error the giving (or failure to give)
specific instructions without objection, any such claim of error is waived.
Even if Fulton’s claims of instructional error are not waived by operation of the rule,
Fulton affirmatively waived any objections to the instructions or special verdict form below: The
district court specifically asked defense counsel if he had any objections to the instructions.
(Supp. Tr., p.57, Ls.6-7.) He responded, “No objection, Your Honor.” (Supp. Tr., p.57, Ls.6-8.)
The district court then asked defense counsel if there were any other instructions it should give.
(Supp. Tr., p.57, Ls.20-22.) Again, defense counsel responded, “No, Your Honor.” (Supp. Tr.,
p.57, L.23.) Finally, the district court asked the parties, “is there any objection to the verdict
form—the special verdict form that I’m using?” (Supp. Tr., p.57, L.24 – p.58, L.1.) Defense
counsel responded, “No, Your Honor.” (Supp. Tr., p.58, L.2.) Because the error is waived,
Fulton’s arguments must fail on the first prong of the fundamental error test.

5

The most recent amendment to the rule keeps the same language. See I.C.R. 30(b)(4) (2017).
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Second, Fulton’s arguments must fail because this Court lacks an adequate record to
determine if any alleged error in the jury instructions is clear on that record. The record
discloses that there was an informal jury instruction conference held in the district judge’s
chambers. (Tr., p.153, Ls.20-25.) This conference is unreported. There was also a later formal
conference on the jury instructions. (Tr., p.155, Ls.3-8.) The record contains the transcript of
the formal conference. (Supp. Tr., pp.56-60.) Before that conference, the parties had apparently
already reviewed the final jury instructions and settled on 19 of them. (Supp. Tr., p.56, Ls.4-12.)
No jury instructions were presented at the formal conference. The record provided on appeal
does not disclose which party, if either, requested any of the instructions of which Fulton
complains—the statutory based instruction verses the I.C.J.I. stock instructions, or both; using
the colloquial “sexual abuse” rather than the statutory “sexual battery” on the special verdict
form; etc. 6 It may well have been the defense that requested these instructions. If so, at worst,
this would be invited error, and Fulton would be estopped from raising it on appeal. See State v.
Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000). Without a clear record, Fulton
cannot show that any error in the instructions is clear on the record, and he has therefore failed to
preserve for review on appeal any issue regarding the jury instructions.
Moreover, what is revealed in the record presented on appeal (as shown above) is that
defense counsel approved of the jury instructions and special verdict form. “It has long been the
law in Idaho that one may not successfully complain of errors one has acquiesced in or invited.
Errors consented to, acquiesced in, or invited are not reversible.” State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho
345, 379, 313 P.3d 1, 35 (2013) (quoting State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 838, 673 P.2d 436, 438

6

If the state’s pretrial requested jury instructions are indicative of those it may have requested
during the unreported informal conference, it does not appear that any of the instructions Fulton
complains of (for the first time on appeal) originated with the state. (See R., pp.61-64.)
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(1983)) (internal citations omitted). The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a
party who “caused or played an important role in prompting a trial court” to take a particular
action from “later challenging that decision on appeal.” State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985
P.2d 117, 120 (1999). The doctrine of invited error squarely applies to this case. As the record
clearly reveals, even assuming instructional error, Fulton at least “consented to” or “acquiesced
in” those alleged errors. Again, Fulton is estopped from challenging the instructions on appeal.
As will be demonstrated below, in addition to failing, generally, in his several claims of
instructional error, Fulton is unable to meet his burden of establishing fundamental error in any
of them individually. He is therefore not entitled to review of these unpreserved issues.

1.

Fulton’s Claims Of Variances Between The Instructions And Charging
Instrument Fail Under The Fundamental Error Standard

For the first time on appeal, Fulton raises several claims of variance between the court’s
instructions to the jury and the state’s charging document. Principally, Fulton alleges both that
the model I.C.J.I.-based instruction (Instruction No. 7) and the statutory-based instruction
(Instruction No. 4) on sexual battery of a minor amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct
created a variance with the charging document. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-18.) 7 This claimed
variance fails on the first prong of Perry because Fulton cannot show the violation of an
unwaived constitutional right.
Variances can arise when “the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts different from
those alleged in the indictment,” Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105 (1979), or when the
7

Though unchallenged by Fulton on appeal, there is an error in I.C.J.I.-based Instruction No. 8.
This instruction includes erotic fondling as conduct that would support a conviction for sexual
battery of a minor not amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct, I.C. § 18-1508A(1)(c). (See
Supp. Tr., p.66, L.25 – p.67, L.20.) As the statute makes clear, erotic fondling would actually
constitute sexual battery amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct, I.C. § 18-1508A(1)(a). Of
course, this error does not prejudice Fulton.
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jury instructions could allow the jury to convict the defendant of the charged crime, but on one or
more alternative theories than alleged in the charging document, see, e.g., State v. Windsor, 110
Idaho 410, 716 P.2d 1182 (1985); State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 166, 90 P.3d 910, 916 (Ct.
App. 2004). Although an actual variance between the instructions and the allegations of a
charging document implicates due process, see, e.g., State v. Gilman, 105 Idaho 891, 893, 673
P.2d 1085, 1088 (Ct. App. 1983), no due process violation actually occurs unless the variance is
fatal, see Montoya, 140 Idaho at 165, 90 P.3d at 915 (citing Windsor, 110 Idaho at 417-18, 716
P.2d at 1189-90 (footnote omitted)). To be fatal, the variance must amount to a “constructive
amendment” that “deprives the defendant of his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk
of double jeopardy,” and so affects the defendant’s substantial rights. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho
41, 49, 89 P.3d 881, 889 (Ct. App. 2003); -see --also -----------State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 479, 272
P.3d 417, 451 (2012) (citations omitted). A constructive amendment occurs if a variance alters
the charging document to the extent that the defendant is tried for a crime of a greater degree or a
different nature. Jones, 140 Idaho at 49, 89 P.3d at 889; State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 566,
871 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Ct. App. 1993).
The variance claimed by Fulton, that the instructions were broader than the charging
document’s focus on manual-genital contact, does not constitute a constructive amendment
because the instructions did not change the nature or degree of the crime with which he was
charged—sexual battery of a minor amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct.

Nor does

Fulton’s claimed variance leave him open to the risk of double jeopardy because the state’s
theory of the case was limited to a specific time and a specific place, and focused on the manualgenital contact as the conclusion of a course of sexual conduct leading thereto. Thus, though the
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jury instructions are broader than the charging instrument, any possible variance caused thereby
is not fatal. Fulton has therefore failed to show the violation of an unwaived constitutional right.
Furthermore, the final prong of fundamental error requires Fulton to “demonstrate that
the error affected his substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the
outcome of the trial proceedings.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. A variance affects
the substantial rights of a defendant only when it is fatal, i.e., “when it deprives the defendant of
his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of double jeopardy.” Montoya, 140 Idaho at
165, 90 P.3d at 915 (citing Windsor, 110 Idaho at 417-78, 716 P.2d 1189-90 (footnote omitted)).
For the reasons set forth above, Fulton has failed to demonstrate that his substantial rights were
affected by the variance he claims for the first time on appeal and has, therefore, failed to satisfy
the final element of the Perry fundamental error analysis.
Later in his brief, Fulton also claims that a variance occurred when he was charged with
sexual battery of a minor amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct, and the district court
ultimately entered judgment against him for sexual battery of a minor amounting to lewd and
lascivious conduct, but the jury actually returned a verdict on sexual abuse of a minor amounting
to lewd and lascivious conduct. (Appellant’s brief, pp.53-57.) A review of the record belies this
claim of a variance.
First, both the statutory instructions and the I.C.J.I. model instructions that were used by
the district court are for sexual battery of a minor, I.C. § 18-1508A, with which Fulton was
charged. (See Tr., p.62, L.18 – p.67, L.20; R., p.44.) The instructions do not correspond to the
distinct crime of sexual abuse, I.C. § 18-1506. Thus, in order to find Fulton guilty of the greater
offense of sexual “abuse” of a minor amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct, the jury was
required to find him guilty of all of the elements corresponding to the charge of sexual battery of
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a minor amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct, with which he was charged. There is,
therefore, no fatal variance.
Second, any alleged error is not clear on the record.

Sexual abuse is used as a

colloquialism. Why the parties chose to use the colloquialism instead of the standard legal term
is unknowable from the record. As noted above, Fulton has failed to provide a sufficient record
to determine whether any alleged error in the jury instructions is clear on the record. The
modified verdict form was apparently settled on at the informal jury instruction conference, for
which there appears to be no record. It is impossible to determine from the appellate record,
therefore, which party, if either, requested the modified verdict form. The record does reveal
that, in a pretrial motion, the state submitted proposed jury instructions and a proposed verdict
form.

(R., pp.61-64.)

The state’s proposed verdict form did not set forth lesser-included

offenses and asked for a verdict on sexual battery of a minor. (See R., p.64.) The record also
reveals that Fulton resides in Utah (Tr., p.132, Ls.9-11), where it appears the crime he committed
would have been defined as sexual abuse, not battery, see Utah Code §§ 76-5-404, 76-5-404.1.
During closing arguments, defense counsel argued for conviction under the lesser-included
offense of battery. (Supp. Tr., p.93, Ls.11-24.) And, as shown above, the record reveals that
defense counsel, when asked if there was an objection to the special verdict form, specifically
did not object. (Supp. Tr., p.57, L.24 – p.58, L.2.)
Fulton has failed to show any fatal variance in the jury instructions. He has failed to
show fundamental error entitling him to review of this unpreserved issue. 8

8

Fulton also asserts that the jury instructions, taken as a whole, permitted the jury to convict
him of conduct that does not constitute sexual battery of a minor amounting to lewd and
lascivious conduct, as defined in Idaho Code § 18-1508A. As shown above (Arg. IV(C)(1)),
Fulton is mistaken.
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2.

Fulton’s Remaining Claims Of Instructional Error Lack Merit

In addition to his claims of variance, Fulton raises several additional claims of
instructional error, none of which has merit.
First, Fulton claims that the district court committed fundamental error by giving the jury
superfluous instructions when it offered instructions based both on Idaho Code § 18-1508A (see
Instruction Nos. 4-5) and on the I.C.J.I. elements instruction for sexual battery of a minor (see
Instruction Nos. 7-8).

(See Appellant’s brief, pp.22-24.)

As noted above, to constitute

fundamental error, the alleged error must violate an unwaived constitutional right. Perry, 150
Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Fulton has failed to show that he has a constitutional right to
streamlined jury instructions. Fulton has therefore failed to show fundamental error entitling him
to review of this unpreserved claim of error.
Fulton next asserts that the district court erred when it offered, as a lesser-included
offense to sexual battery of a minor amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct, an instruction on
sexual battery of a minor not amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.24-25.) This argument is without merit. On its face, sexual battery of a minor not amounting
to lewd and lascivious conduct is clearly a lesser included offense of sexual battery of a minor
amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct: In both, the proscribed conduct is sexually touching
a minor; the only difference is one of degree. And were it not clear on its face, the organization
of the statute itself demonstrates that violations of Idaho Code § 18-1508A(1)(c) are lesser
included offenses of the greater violations of Idaho Code § 18-1508A(1)(a). 9

9

Moreover, Fulton was convicted of the greater offense. Because of the acquittal first doctrine,
the Idaho Supreme Court has previously held that the failure to give a lesser-included offense is
necessarily harmless where a defendant is convicted of the greater offense. State v. Joy, 155
Idaho 1, 7, 304 P.3d 276, 282 (2013). The same analysis should apply to any error in the giving
of a lesser-included offense instruction.
30

Next, Fulton asserts that “it appears that the jury did not have the benefit of all of the jury
instructions during deliberations” and that “[i]t appears only post-proof instructions went into the
jury room for deliberations.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.26.)

Even assuming that Fulton has a

constitutional right for the jury to have all jury instructions with it during jury deliberations,
which Fulton has not shown, his claim would still fail under the fundamental error standard. As
noted above, to constitute fundamental error, the constitutional violation must be clear on the
record. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Fulton’s argument, based on things that may
or may not “appear” to be the case certainly is not clear on the record. This assertion, too, is
without merit.
Finally, Fulton asserts that the district court committed fundamental error when it relied
on the Supreme Court’s precedent in State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 56-57, 245 P.2d 788, 791-92
(1952), to define lewd and lascivious conduct in response to a question from the jury.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.47-53.) Here, too, Fulton cannot show fundamental error entitling him to
review of this unpreserved claim of error.
For a constitutional error to plainly exist, it must be clear in the law. State v. Hadden,
152 Idaho 371, 375, 271 P.3d 1227, 1231 (Ct. App. 2012). As Fulton acknowledges, the district
court’s definition is taken directly from the Idaho Supreme Court’s Evans decision. Though a
federal district court may have ignored Evans when determining that the terms lewd and
lascivious were vague, see Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 567 F.Supp 1371 (1983), that decision has
no bearing on whether Evans remains good law. The decisions of lower federal courts are not
binding on Idaho state courts. State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413, ___, 398 P.3d 146, 148 (2017)
(citing Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Services, Inc., 142 Idaho 235, 240, 127
P.3d 138, 143 (2005)). And, in fact, Evans was cited favorably by the Idaho Supreme Court

31

more than a decade after the federal district court’s opinion. See State v. Oar, 129 Idaho 337,
342, 924 P.2d 599, 604 (1996).
Evans has never been overturned by the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States
Supreme Court. There is no express definition of lewd and lascivious conduct in the Idaho code
and no other Idaho precedent defining what lewd and lascivious conduct is, as opposed to what it
is not. It is possible that the definition offered in Evans of lewd and lascivious conduct is, as
Fulton argues, incorrect and out-of-date. But to preserve that argument, where there is no clear
law defining lewd and lascivious conduct or overturning the Evans decision, Fulton was required
to raise an objection before the district court. He failed to do so. He has therefore failed to
preserve this issue for review on appeal.
Moreover, as noted above, this Court lacks an adequate record to determine if this alleged
error is clear on the record. When the jury requested a definition of lewd and lascivious conduct,
the district judge called in both parties. The district court noted, “we’ve got both counsel here
together. We found a case, State versus Evans, 73 Idaho 50, that gives a definition of lascivious
… and lewd.” (Tr., p.167, Ls.18-21.) There is no indication in the record provided on appeal
which party invited the district court to use the definitions contained in Evans. It may have been
the defense. If so, at worst, this would again be invited error, and Fulton would be estopped
from raising it on appeal. Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 379, 313 P.3d at 35 (citations omitted). Without
a clear record, Fulton cannot show that the error is clear on the record, and, again, has failed to
show entitlement to appellate review of this unpreserved issue.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Fulton’s conviction for sexual
battery of a minor amounting to lewd and lascivious conduct.
DATED this 6th day of December, 2017.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer___________________
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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